THE LAWYERS WEEKLY
April 13, 2012 | 5
query whether courts should be
entering that field. In other words,
where issues of public policy are at
stake, should the courts defer to
the policy decisions of governments or not? Essentially, what the
court has said is no. If it is a breach
of the Charter, it is a breach of the
Charter. I think the result is, you
are certainly moving a lot of policy-making into the courts.
TLW: Which areas will spark
more Charter litigation in the
years ahead?
Hogg: I think the other provision that will continue to provide
a lot of action over the next 30
years is section 15, the equality
guarantee. What has happened
in section 15 is that the court
keeps changing its mind as to
what the doctrine is, so every few
years—it is astonishing how frequent this has been—every few
years, there is a significant change
in the rules as to when you have a
breach of section 15. I think what
that means is that it is quite hard
to predict where section 15 will
go. The courts have developed
various doctrines, which have
been designed to limit the scope
of section 15, because every law is
potentially subject to a section 15
attack. The trouble is they keep
struggling with what the various
limitations are.
TLW: Do you think the restrictions will be loosened?
Hogg: One of the restrictions on
section 15 was that the person
complaining had to persuade the
court that he was treated differ-
ently from other people in the
same position—the comparabil-
ity rule. That idea has been loos-
ened. Another doctrine the court
had was that the person making
the claim of inequality had to
show his human dignity had been
impaired…they loosened that
requirement. They are still adher-
ing to the requirement that there
must be a ground that is listed in
section 15 or a ground that is
analogous to those listed in sec-
tion 15. If that were loosened as
well, we would end up with a
considerable expansion of section
15. But I think it is hard to pre-
dict. By the same token, the
courts may well decide to con-
tract these rights. That is true of
section 7 as well.
TLW: If changes in technology
make it easier for the state to potentially infringe your privacy, are
the courts likely to apply the
principles already established
under section 8 to decide if there
is a Charter breach?
Hogg: I think that is an area
where the principles are likely to
remain the same. I think what is
troublesome about section 7 and
section 15 is that new principles
keep piling on so that it does
make it very difficult to predict
where the courts are likely to go
in the future.
TLW: The Supreme Court has
very been very clear about the
importance of open courts and
limiting any restrictions on publication. Yet, at the trial levels, it is
not uncommon for judges to find
exceptions to the open court rules.
In Mentuck [R. v. Mentuck,
[2001] 3 S.C.R. 442, 2001 SCC
76], the Supreme Court suggested
there be an explicit right for media
to appeal publication bans, yet
this has not yet happened.
Hogg: I think in all those cases
where there are publication bans
or other kinds of restrictions on
the media, the media should have
the right to be represented before
any final decision is made and the
media should have a right of
appeal. The media, in effect, do
represent the public in these open
courts [and] access to justice
issues, because most people can’t
actually come to the courthouse
and listen to the proceedings.
TLW: Do you see more tension
between politicians and the judiciary, especially with the introduction of mandatory minimum sentences by the federal government?
Hogg: I think there will be some
increased tension over the mandatory minimum sentences. The
courts initially struck down mandatory minimum sentences
because they said if they would be
disproportionate to the most
innocent possible offender, they
were unconstitutional. The court
has backed off from that. But I
think we will have a new battle
about mandatory minimum sentences if more of them become
law. The court will have to determine how committed it is to individualized sentencing.
What has happened in
section 15 is that the
court keeps changing
its mind as to what
the doctrine is ...
every few years, there
is a significant change
in the rules...
“
Peter Hogg
Blake, Cassels & Graydon
TLW: What do you see as some of
the most significant developments
in the 30 years of the Charter?
Hogg: I think you would have to
say the equality guarantee, as dif-
ficult as it has been to apply, has
had some very important conse-
quences. Abortion has been
decriminalized. Same-sex mar-
riage is also section 15. Those
seem to me to be two areas where
governments were reluctant to
act because of concerns over pub-
lic opinion—and courts took
over. I suspect that is very clear
with respect to gay and lesbian
rights. Most people have adapted
to a world where those rights are
acceptable and where there
should not be any discrimination.
That is one area. Freedom of
expression is another. The media
have had some important success
under freedom of expression. The
Grant case [Grant v. Torstar
Corp., 2009 SCC 61, [2009] 3
S.C.R. 640] in which the defence
of responsible journalism was
introduced into defamation pro-
ceedings, I think is a very import-
ant development.
TLW: One provision of the
Charter that is rarely talked about
anymore is the notwithstanding
clause, which allows governments to override fundamental
rights. Is it a tool that governments will use in the future?
Hogg: I don’t know the answer
to that, but it was used by Quebec
to re-enact language laws that
the courts had struck down—
language of signs. It seems to me
that it was not a bad thing
because for Quebec at that time,
that was a fundamental public
policy that had been, in effect,
undermined by the court. You are
probably not going to find many
people of this opinion, but I think
the notwithstanding clause is a
desirable safeguard against overreach by the judges. It does mean
that if a government feels sufficiently strongly about a particular decision, it can overcome it in
the end. But I don’t know whether
this will happen more in the next
30 years or not. It depends on
whether the courts will continue
to expand their use of section 7,
[striking] down legislation to
which governments are very
strongly attached. If that were to
happen, I could imagine a government using the notwithstanding clause. I do not object to the
notwithstanding clause. A lot of
lawyers, a lot of people do object
to it. Trudeau didn’t want it.
TLW: In its 2009 decision in R v.
Grant, the Supreme Court
reformulated the section 24( 2)
test for exclusion of evidence.
Many defence lawyers, at least,
have suggested that the pendulum has now swung too far back
in favour of deference to police.
Hogg: Before Grant, I thought
the pendulum had swung too far
in favour of the exclusion of evidence. It had become almost an
automatic exclusion for some categories of cases. So, I think all
that the court has done in Grant,
is just restore the judicial discretion in 24( 2) that they were supposed to have in the beginning.
TLW: The Charter of Rights is still
a relatively new document. But
will its impact be much more
incremental in the next 30 years?
Hogg: I think a lot has been done
in the last 30 years. But I think a
lot more will be done in the next 30
years as well. People have become
accustomed to there being a
Charter of Rights. I started by complaining that it shifts too much
power to judges and lawyers. But
you have to recognize that nearly
all civilized countries have a charter of rights with some degree of
judicial review for their breach. So,
we are really in the mainstream.
So, I think that people will accept
that this is part of our structure of
government and, yes, it does give
courts some powers they did not
have before 1982. I expect that,
over the next 30 years, perhaps
there will be a gradual expansion
of rights. At the same time, I don’t
feel concerned about that. On balance, we have improved our country’s governance by having the
Charter of Rights. n
To listen to excerpts
of the Peter Hogg
interview go to
www.lawyersweekly.ca
■ SUPREME COURT OF CANADA ■ Key Charter rulings, 1982–2012
Absolute liability offences with
possibility of imprisonment, found to
violate s. 7. A sign that the section would
not be limited to procedural fairness.
A section of the Alberta Judicature Act
that restricted reporting of divorce cases,
was found to violate s. 2(b). The court
described freedom of expression as of
fundamental importance to a democracy.
The right to full answer and defence
under s. 7 must also be balanced
against privacy interests and
equality guarantees. No single
principle is absolute.
Quebec legislation that prohibited
private health insurance was found to
violate s. 7 and the Quebec Charter, on
the grounds that it was arbitrary.
The federal government’s refusal to grant
an exemption to the CDSA for a safe-
injection site in Vancouver is found to be
arbitrary and a violation of s. 7 rights.
Reverse onus section of Narcotics
Control Act found to violate
presumption of innocence. S. 1 test to
establish reasonable limit, still in place.
The Crown duty to disclose includes
all “relevant” information in its
possession, as part of right to full
answer and defence.
The recognition of equality rights for
one group, by legalizing same-sex
marriage, cannot in itself, violate the
equality rights of another group.
The right to collective bargaining,
does not mean that a particular form
of collective bargaining is protected,
said the Court in upholding an Ontario
law that governs agricultural workers.
1985
Reference Re B.C.
Motor Vehicle Act
1986
R
v. Oakes
1989
Edmonton Journal
v. Alberta
1991
R
v. Stinchcombe
1999
R
v. Mills
2004
Reference
re Same Sex Marriage
2005
Chaoulli
v. Quebec
2011
Ontario
v. Fraser
2011
Canada v. PHS
Community Services