ABORIGINAL LAW
COMMUNITIES AND GOVERN-
ANCE – Representative and advocacy
organizations – Taxation – Tax exemp-
tions – Income tax.
Appeal by Bellrose from the dismissal
of his income tax reassessment appeals.
The Métis Nation of Alberta Association
was incorporated under the Societies
Act, with the objectives of promoting the
development, self-determination, constitutional and property rights of Métis
in Alberta. Bellrose served as an elected
official of the Association between 1996
and 2011. In four of those years, Bellrose
claimed an income tax exemption in the
amount of one-third of his remuneration
from the Association on the basis that
his role was equivalent to that of an
elected officer of an incorporated municipality. The Minister of National Revenue disagreed, and reassessed Bellrose
for each of those four years. The Tax
Court judge dismissed Bellrose’s appeal,
notwithstanding the finding that Bellrose performed commendable services
for Métis in need. The Tax Court judge
found that the services the Association
provided were not akin to those provided
by municipalities and that the Association’s Regional Councils did not have
self-government powers. Bellrose argued
before the Federal Court that he was
entitled to a tax-free allowance as an
officer of an incorporated municipality.
Bellrose submitted that the Association
was a form of government for Métis persons in Alberta on par with other municipalities in the province.
HELD: Appeal dismissed. It was not
relevant that the Association was unable
to provide services akin to those provided
by municipalities because of a lack of
resources. Regardless of the reason, a
body not providing municipal-like services was not a municipality. There was no
obligation on the judge’s part to interpret
the Income Tax Act in a manner favourable to Bellrose, as an aboriginal person,
as the Act was neither a treaty nor a statute directly related to aboriginal peoples.
The Municipal Government Act was
inconsistent with a municipality not
defined by a geographic area.
Bellrose v. Canada, [2012] F.C.J.
No. 301, Federal Court of Appeal, Shar-
low, Dawson and Trudel JJ.A., Febru-
ary 29, 2012. Digest No. 3145-001
BANKRUPTCY
& INSOLVENCY LAW
ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATE –
Administrative officials and appointees
– Duties and powers – Proofs of claim
or security – Disallowance.
Application by the creditor to set aside
the Notice of Dispute of Property Claim.
The bankrupt made his assignment into
bankruptcy in July 2011. One of the bank-
rupt’s listed assets was a 2007 Peterbilt
truck valued at $65,000 and acquired
under a financing agreement with the
applicant. The trustee conducted a name
search that did not disclose any record of
security registration, though a Serial
Numbered Good Search did. The trustee
issued the Notice on the basis that it was
improper for the applicant to file a prop-
erty claim under the Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Act because the contract was
governed by the Personal Property Secur-
ity Act, the applicant failed to perfect its
interest, and unperfected security was not
effective against the trustee. The appli-
cant argued that the submission of com-
pleted financial documentation to the
trustee was adequate and that the Vehicle
Lease Agreement created an express trust
preserving the applicant’s ownership.
COMMERCIAL LAW
FRANCHISING – Franchise agree-
ment – Term.
Motion by Tim Hortons franchisees to
certify their action against TDL Group
and Tim Hortons as a class proceeding.
Motion by TDL Group and Tim Hortons
for summary judgment dismissing the
plaintiffs’ claims. The plaintiffs claimed
that Tim Hortons breached the express or
implied terms of the franchise agreement
by requiring franchisees to purchase
“Always Fresh” ingredients and “Lunch
Menu” ingredients, either at prices that
were greater than the market price or at
commercially unreasonable prices,
thereby eroding their profits. The first
claim, the cost of donuts, stemmed from
the “Always Fresh” Conversion. Until
2002, most baked goods sold in Tim Hor-
tons stores were baked on the premises
from scratch by skilled bakers, using
donut mixes and other ingredients sup-
plied by Tim Hortons. Between 2002 and
2004, Tim Hortons replaced scratch bak-
ing with a system called Always Fresh in
which the dough was partially baked and
flash frozen (referred to as par-baking) at
a centralized facility and delivered frozen
to the franchisees’ stores, where the bak-
ing would be completed in specially-
designed ovens. The par-baked donuts
that franchisees were required to buy
were supplied by a joint venture, in which
Tim Hortons had an interest. The plain-
tiffs pleaded that, contrary to representa-
tions made to franchisees before the
Always Fresh Conversion, the cost to pro-
duce donuts and other baked goods had
increased, cutting into their profits. They
claimed that Tim Hortons made enor-
mous profits on the sale of the par-baked
donuts at the franchisees’ expense, and
that it ignored their requests for sale
price hikes to offset the increased costs.
They claimed that Tim Hortons breached
express terms of their franchise agree-
ments by implementing the Always Fresh
Conversion, which was not for their
financial benefit, and that it breached an
implied term of those agreements that
ingredients would be sold to franchisees
at lower prices than they could obtain in
the marketplace. The plaintiffs’ second
complaint related to the “Lunch Menu”
which included soups and sandwiches.
The plaintiffs claimed that Tim Hortons
required franchisees to sell Lunch Menu
items at either break-even prices or at a
loss. They claimed that while they were
selling these items at a loss, Tim Hortons
was making a profit through rent, royal-
ties and advertising payments, all of
which were calculated based on franchis-
ees’ sales. They claimed that this was also
a breach of an implied term of their con-
tracts that ingredients would be sold to
them at lower prices than they could
obtain in the marketplace.
CONFLICT OF LAWS
JURISDICTION – Determination of
– Real and substantial connection –
Where cause of action arose.
Appeal by the Workers’ Compensation
Board of Alberta from the dismissal of its
application for an order staying House’s
action on the ground that the Superior
Court of Newfoundland lacked jurisdiction. House worked and lived in Alberta
when he sustained a workplace injury on
February 26, 2005. He fell from a roof,
resulting in fractures to his skull, back
and shoulder. His claim to the Board for
benefits was accepted on the basis of a
temporary disability. A few months after
the accident, House returned to Newfoundland, where he currently resided.
Due to the Board’s handling of his compensation claim, House brought an action
for misfeasance and abuse of public office.
His primary complaint was the Board’s
refusal to pay benefits for a secondary
injury, even after a favourable ruling from
the Appeals Commission. House’s initial
medical treatment was provided while he
was still in Alberta. Subsequent medical
assessments and treatments were provided by health professionals in Alberta,
Ontario, Newfoundland and Nova Scotia.
The chambers judge held that the court
had sufficient territorial jurisdiction to
try the action. Although components of
the alleged wrongful conduct were decisions of the defendants taken in Alberta,
many other aspects of the claim suggested a real and substantial connection
between Newfoundland and the claim.
The secondary injury occurred in Newfoundland, all the wrongful deeds alleged
against the Board occurred while House
lived in Newfoundland, and all the consequences of the alleged wrongs were suffered in Newfoundland.
HELD: Appeal allowed. The chambers judge erred in finding territorial
jurisdiction. At the core of the action was
the conduct of the Board in Alberta in
the administration of a workers’ compensation claim based on an injury suffered
in Alberta and made pursuant to the
statutory scheme established in that
