appellant. Appellant sought variation of
the will. The chambers judge determined
that he was bound by Hope v Raeder, in
which the word “children” in s. 2 of the
Wills Variation Act (B.C.) was restricted
to natural or adopted children of the testator.
HELD: Appeal dismissed. The facts
were not sufficiently compelling to justify
reconsideration of the Hope decision. The
plaintiff was unable to bring herself within
the definition of “child” under comparable
legislation in any jurisdiction. The testator
never had any intention of acting as a
father to appellant and did not consider
her as a member of his family. The testator
did not stand in loco parentis to appellant.
The relationship between appellant and
the testator did not justify expansion of the
meaning of “child” or “children” to fit
appellant’s circumstances.
Doman Peri v. Doman Estate, [2011]
B.C.J. No. 1904, B.C.C.A., per Prowse
J.A. (Frankel, Neilson, Bennett and
Hinkson JJ.A. concurring), Oct. 14/11.
Digest No. 3126-011 (Approx. 9 pp.)
The husband fell into areas in 2009.
When one child moved out of the wife’s
home and left school in 2009, the husband reduced child support and paid
$2,000 per month to that child. The 2011
order reduced child support to $4,100
per month as of April 2011 based on a
material change in circumstances.
HELD: Appeal dismissed. Cross-appeal allowed. The reduction in child
support was justified as the husband had
two other dependent children, his income
had changed and one of the children had
moved out and left school. The chambers
judge did not err in concluding that there
were no arrears on the basis that the husband’s over-payments and under-pay-ments balanced out. The judge did err,
however, in maintaining the original 1998
support for the first three months of 2011.
That part of the order was varied to provide that payments of $4,100 were to
commence in January 2011.
McMahon v. Miller, [2011] A.J. No.
1062, Alta. C.A., per Slatter J.A.
(O’Ferrall and Park JJ.A. concurring),
Oct. 14/11. Digest No. 3126-013
(Approx. 3 pp.)
Motion by the mother for production
of documents from third party organizations. Cross-motion by the father for
security for costs. The parties married in
2001. They had two sons, aged 12 and 10.
In 2007, the family moved to the State of
Georgia. The parties separated in 2009.
The Georgia court found that acts of violence had occurred and, on consent, it
granted the mother temporary custody of
the children, temporary child and spousal
support and an order restraining the
father from contact with the mother. The
court later awarded the parties temporary
joint legal custody with the mother to
have physical custody. The mother left
Georgia and returned to Ontario with the
children. The mother did not attend the
hearing of her petition for divorce in
Georgia. As a result, the Georgian court
awarded sole custody of the children to
the father. Thereafter, the mother filed an
application in Ontario for custody of the
children, child support and for a
restraining order on the basis that the
children would suffer serious harm if
returned to the father’s custody because
they had been subjected to physical and
emotional abuse. The father moved to
have the Georgia order recognized. The
court recognized and enforced the Georgia court’s order and the mother was
ordered to surrender the children to the
father. The mother appealed the enforcement of the Georgia order and sought an
order to compel certain third party organizations, including children’s aid societies
and the children’s schools, to provide her
with all documents relating to her, the
father or the children.
HELD: Motion dismissed. Cross-
motion allowed. While the documents
requested by the mother were not avail-
able by any other method, the request was
part of a pattern of the mother’s conduct
to delay the matter, and the documents
would not have met the test for introduc-
tion of fresh evidence on appeal. An order
for security of costs was appropriate as
the mother had insufficient assets in
Ontario to satisfy a costs order. Further-
more, her appeal was devoid of merit as
there was no evidence of the Georgia
court’s inability to consider the best inter-
ests of the children.
FAMILY LAW
ACCESS – The parties could not
enter into an agreement that terminated the father’s access to the child of
the marriage in exchange for the termination of child support obligations.
Motion by the father to change a final
consent order entered into by the parties.
The consent order terminated the father’s
access to his young child, rescinded his
obligation to pay arrears of child support
and eliminated his obligation to pay
ongoing child support. The parties’ son
was 5 years old. The father had had drug
abuse issues and had been sporadically
employed. He relinquished his access
rights in exchange for a termination of his
child support obligations. Since the consent order, the father had undergone
counselling, stopped taking drugs and
obtained a full-time job.
HELD: Motion allowed. The court had
jurisdiction to vary the order regardless
of any change in circumstances. The
agreement giving rise to the order was
inconsistent with the policies underlying
the Divorce Act and was invalid. The
rights that were bargained away by the
agreement were rights of the child, not
rights of the parents. The father was
ordered to pay monthly child support of
$420. The parties were to share section 7
expenses proportionately. The parties
were given two weeks to arrive at an
arrangement for supervised access.
Kroupa v. Stoneham, [2011] O.J.
No. 4350, Ont. S.C.J., Gray J., Oct.
4/11. Digest No. 3126-012 (Approx. 10
pp.)
MATRIMONIAL HOME – The
court maintained the status quo and
allowed the mother and children to
remain in the matrimonial home.
Motion by the mother for custody,
child support, exclusive possession of the
matrimonial home and an order the
father pay the monthly expenses, or pay
that amount as spousal support. Cross-motion by the father for joint custody and
exclusive possession of the matrimonial
home. The parties lived together for three
years, for one of which they were married.
After separation, the parties tried to live
separately within the matrimonial home.
In July 2011, the father was charged with
assaulting the mother and required to
leave the matrimonial home. The mother
and the two children had lived there
since. The father earned $45,909 annually. The mother was a part-time student
and worked 20 hours per week at $10.25
per hour. Under the current consent
order, the five-year-old and three-year-old children lived primarily with the
mother and the father had access every
Friday and Saturday and evenings the
mother worked. The mother argued the
status quo should continue.
HELD: Motion and cross-motion
allowed in part. The current living
arrangements were settled, structured
and greatly reduced conflict while
allowing the children to spend significant
time with both parents. Preserving the
status quo was in the children’s best interests. Since the father was not permitted to
attend the matrimonial home and the
children should not be forced to leave the
home, the mother was granted exclusive
possession. The father was to pay $694
monthly child support. Both parties were
able parents and able to communicate
about major issues. The parties were
ordered to jointly make decisions on significant issues regarding the children.
Porter v. Hamilton, [2011] O.J. No.
4363, Ont. S.C.J., Shaw J., Sept. 30/11.
Digest No. 3126-014 (Approx. 10 pp.)
PROPERTY – The trial judge did
not err in his valuation of the shares of
a sawmill business.
Appeal by the wife from the valuation
of a sawmill business for the purpose of
division of family assets. The parties separated in May 2009 after a 28-year marriage. A family-operated hardwood sawmill business provided employment to
the husband and three children. The
principle issue regarding the division of
assets was the value of the mill. The company owned the real property on which
the mill was situated and the mill’s equipment. The company’s financial statements for the previous five years showed
operational losses in two years and bare
gains in a third year. The husband’s expert
valued the shares of the business at
$369,000 using a voluntary liquidation
approach. The wife’s expert valued the
business at $862,000 based on its fair
market value as a going concern. The trial
judge accepted several of the critiques
raised by the wife’s expert. The judge concluded that the appropriate valuation of
the shares was $500,000. The wife
appealed on the ground that the judge
erred in law by failing to provide adequate
or sufficient reasons for his valuation of
that asset.
HELD: Appeal dismissed. There was
no error of law in the adequacy of the trial
judge’s reasons. The judge was faced with
a wide range of potential share values,
calculated under two different valuation
approaches. The judge recognized that
the court’s valuation would necessarily be
arbitrary to some degree, given the uncertainty associated with the company’s
future. In choosing a fair market value of
$500,000, it could be inferred that the
judge took into account the competing
considerations of the company’s potential, its value as an ongoing concern, the
unique features of the business and
Classifieds
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CHILD SUPPORT – The appellate
court dismissed the wife’s appeal from
an order varying child support and
cancelling support arrears.
Appeal by the wife from a 2011 order
varying a 1998 child support order and
cancelling the support arrears. Cross-appeal by the husband from a provision
of the order continuing child support as
set out in the 1998 order for the first three
months of 2011. Pursuant to the 1998
order, the husband was required to pay
$6,500 per month in child support for
two children until each child had completed his first post-secondary degree.
PROCEDURE – The appellate court
dismissed the mother’s motion for pro-
duction of documents from third party
organizations and ordered her to pay
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RE: ESTATE OF DOROTHY
MILLIE SWINGLE, Deceased
Anyone having knowledge of a Will
of Dorothy Millie Swingle, late of
Hamilton, Ontario, who died on
November 10, 2001 is requested to
contact Mary Lou Dingle, Lazier
Hickey Lawyers LLP, 25 Main St. W.,
15th Floor, Hamilton, ON, L8P 1H1,
T: 905-525-3652; F: 905-525-6278.
RE: ESTATE OF JOHN
SANEFORD SWINGLE, Deceased
Anyone having knowledge of a Will
of John Saneford Swingle, late of
Hamilton, Ontario, who died on or
about September 28, 1982 is
requested to contact Mary Lou
Dingle, Lazier Hickey Lawyers LLP,
25 Main St. W., 15th Floor, Hamilton,
ON, L8P 1H1, T: 905-525-3652; F:
905-525-6278..
TO PLACE YOUR
Please Contact
Juli Hlibka 905-415-5801
1-800-668-6481 ex. 801
juli.hlibka@lexisnexis.ca
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