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did. If your chronic inability to
master any social skills…has led
you to become pedantic, aggres-
sive, and petty in your daily life,
it makes no difference to me; it
seems to suit you well. If, how-
ever, you deliberately introduce
these character traits while
exercising your judicial func-
tions, and you make it your
trademark, then it concerns me
a great deal, and I feel that it is
appropriate to tell you.”
Doré went on to accuse the
judge of being “fundamentally
unjust” and of using the Bench
“to launch ugly, vulgar and
mean personal attacks.”
(Doré’s subsequent com-
plaint to the CJC resulted in a
withering reprimand of Justice
Boilard for what the council’s
subcommittee said were
unwarranted and insulting per-
sonal attacks on Doré. The judi-
cial discipline panel said Justice
Boilard’s “disdainful” attitude
and “flagrant lack of respect”
towards an officer of the court
risked undermining Doré’s pro-
fessional reputation in front of
his client, peers and the public,
as well as tarnishing the image
of both the judiciary and Justice
Boilard himself. The CJC fur-
ther admonished Justice Boil-
ard to treat all lawyers who
appeared before him in future
with “respect and courtesy.”)
WITHOUT PREJUDICE OR ADMISSION
Jean-Guy Boilard
Sir,
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process.
I have just left the Court. Just a few minutes ago, as you cowardly
hid behind your status, you made comments about me that were
both unjust and unjustified, scattering them here and there in a
decision the good faith of which will most likely be argued before
our Court of Appeal.
Since you marched out quickly and refused to hear me, I have
chosen to write a letter as an entirely personal response to the
equally personal remarks you permitted yourself to make about
me. This letter, therefore, is from man to man and is outside the
ambit of my profession and your functions.
If no one has ever told you the following, then it is high time someone did. If your chronic inability to master any social skills (to use an
expression in English, that language you love so much), has led you
to become pedantic, aggressive, and petty in your daily life, it
makes no difference to me; it seems to suit you well.
If however, you deliberately introduce these character traits while
exercising your judicial functions, and you make it your trademark,
then it concerns me a great deal, and I feel that it is appropriate to
tell you.
Your legal knowledge, which appears to have earned the approval of
a certain number of your colleagues, is far from sufficient to make
you the person you could or should be professionally. Your determination to purge any humanity from your judicial position, your essentially non-existent listening skills, and your propensity to use your
court – where you lack the courage to hear opinions contrary to
your own – to launch ugly, vulgar, and mean personal attacks not
only confirms that you are as loathsome as suspected, but also
casts shame on you as a judge, that most extraordinarily important
function that was entrusted to you.
I would have liked to say this to you personally but I highly doubt
that, given your arrogance, you are able to face your detractors
without hiding behind your judicial position.
Worse still, you possess the most appalling of all shortcomings
for a man in your position: You are fundamentally unjust and I
doubt that that will ever change.
Sincerely,
Gilles Doré
P.S. As this letter is purely personal, I see no need to distribute it.
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• Illustrates a collection of dispute resolution processes that can be
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choices
At the judicial review of
Doré’s suspension, Doré did not
contest aims of the rules of professional conduct and Code of
Ethics of Advocates — nor the
rules themselves — which
require a lawyer’s conduct to
“bear the stamp of objectivity,
moderation and dignity” and
not to derogate from the profession’s honour or dignity.
However he contended that
the Barreau’s disciplinary coun-
cil misapplied the rules in his
case, thus rendering its decision
constitutionally invalid. He said
the Barreau failed to adduce
any evidence to discharge its
burden, under s. 1 of the Char-
ter, of justifying the infringe-
ment on his freedom of expres-
sion. Moreover, Doré contended
that the judicial system did not
need the protection of the disci-
plinary decision in the circum-
stances. He pointed to then-
Justice Peter Cory’s famous
words in R. v. Kopyto, [1987]
O.J. No. 1052 (where the
Ontario Court of Appeal over-
turned a contempt conviction
against a lawyer who told a
reporter that the courts and the
RCMP were sticking so close
together “you would think they
were put together with Krazy
glue”) that “the courts are not
fragile flowers that will wither
in the hot heat of controversy.”
In dismissing Doré’s appeal,
the Quebec Court of Appeal
affirmed that Doré’s freedom of
expression was violated by the
disciplinary decision. However
this limit on his speech was rea-
sonable and demonstrably justi-
fied under s. 1 of the Charter.
“Aside from the personal
insults contained in the letter,
telling a judge that he is ‘
fundamentally unjust’ attacks the
very foundation of the judicial
role,” Justice Andre Rochon
wrote for Justices Jacques
Dufresne and Jacques Leger.
“The expression that is
restricted in the present case is
that of the appellant, who
wishes to express himself, without moderation, about the conduct and personality of a judge,
in a letter containing insults
and personal attacks” (all
excerpts from Justice Rochon’s
reasons are translated from
French).
Justice Rochon noted that
the letter came from a person
whose status as a lawyer would
lend credibility to his comments
in the public mind. Who wants
to argue a case before a judge
alleged to be fundamentally
unjust, queried Justice Rochon.
He held that the infringement
on Doré’s freedom of expression
was reasonable, since it pun-
ished his insulting speech, but
did not restrict his expression
more than necessary
“Lawyers may, of course,
The letter at issue in Doré v. Bernard as it appears in the Court of Appeal’s
judgment (unofficial translation).
“We are asking the
court to read the code
of ethics to intrude as
little as possible on
lawyers’ free speech.
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criticize the legal system and all
those who participate in it, but
they must do so with objectivity,
moderation and dignity,” Justice
Rochon stipulated. “This does
not mean that the criticism can-
not be strong or even severe.”
Notably, the appeal court
held that Doré could not rea-
sonably have expected that his
letter would remain private,
given the parties’ status and
function and that the letter
came about as an extension of a
legal case.
